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a b s t r a c t
In the last decade, there has been growing interest in Vehicular Ad Hoc NETworks (VANETs). Today
car manufacturers have already started to equip vehicles with sophisticated sensors that can provide
many assistive features such as front collision avoidance, automatic lane tracking, partial autonomous
driving, suggestive lane changing, and so on. Such technological advancements are enabling the adoption
of VANETs not only to provide safer and more comfortable driving experience but also provide many
other useful services to the driver as well as passengers of a vehicle. However, privacy, authentication
and secure message dissemination are some of the main issues that need to be thoroughly addressed
and solved for the widespread adoption/deployment of VANETs. Given the importance of these issues,
researchers have spent a lot of effort in these areas over the last decade. We present an overview of the
following issues that arise in VANETs: privacy, authentication, and secure message dissemination. Then
we present a comprehensive review of various solutions proposed in the last 10 years which address
these issues. Our survey sheds light on some open issues that need to be addressed in the future.
© 2020 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).

1. Introduction
Several applications such as early warning systems which can
warn about road construction, collisions, weather-related hazards,
merging lanes, speed limits for curves, and pedestrian crossing
warnings, are ready for the widespread deployment in Vehicular
Ad-hoc NETworks (VANETs). Apart from assisting drivers to drive
safely, VANETs can also provide infotainment to drivers/passengers
for a more enjoyable driving as well as riding experience. Furthermore, VANETs can also assist in paying for parking and tolls,
ﬁnding parking places, updating inbuilt vehicle navigation systems
with real-time traﬃc situation, and downloading music, video and
software updates [1–3]. VANETs can also assist law enforcement
agencies in reconstructing accidents as well as reaching the location of the accidents faster.
The general model of VANETs proposed in the literature consists of two major components: On Board Units (OBUs), installed
on vehicles, and Road Side Units (RSUs) installed on roadside to
support the infrastructure needed for the deployment of VANETs.
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Each vehicle is assumed to be equipped with a set of sensors
to collect phenomena surrounding the vehicle; the OBU processes
the information collected by the sensors and sends/receives them
to/from other relevant vehicles directly or through nearby RSUs [4].
The RSUs may also connect to the Internet to provide the necessary services to vehicles. A broad range of applications can be
enabled by two main types of communication: (i) infrastructurebased communication (Vehicle to Infrastructure (V2I) communication) and (ii) direct communication between vehicles (Vehicle to
Vehicle (V2V) communication) [5] as shown in Fig. 1. Major efforts for standardizing VANETs communication protocols have been
carried out by the IEEE 802.11 Task Group by deﬁning enhancements to IEEE 802.11 required to support Intelligent Transportation
Systems (ITS) applications. This amendment is currently known
as IEEE 802.11p. The wireless communication capability between
moving vehicles is achieved by using Dedicated Short Range Communication (DSRC). It is anticipated that DSRC will be used for
both V2V communication and V2I communication. The spectrum is
seen as particularly useful because it can support low-latency, secure transmissions, fast network acquisition and has the ability to
handle rapid and frequent hand-overs that are inherent in VANETs;
it is also robust in adverse weather conditions [6].
Although the excitement surrounding the potential beneﬁts of
VANETs is growing, the dynamic nature of VANETs (vehicles can
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Fig. 1. VANET communication - infrastructure-based and infrastructure-less.

Fig. 2. Securing VANETs using a central Trusted Authority (TA).

join and leave at will) along with a multitude of system and application related requirements make it very challenging to design
eﬃcient methods for ensuring privacy of vehicles. Privacy refers to
the privacy of the vehicles (drivers) and the location of the vehicles. When a vehicle sends a message, no one (except relevant
authorities) should be able to determine the identity or location of
the vehicle from the messages a vehicle sent. At the same time, all
messages sent by a vehicle should be authenticated before being
processed. Until these problems are solved to the best satisfaction
of the users, widespread deployment of VANETs cannot take place.
Authentication needs to be achieved at two levels – ﬁrst at node
level, referred as node authentication and second at the message
level, referred as message authentication [7]. The basic principle
of message authentication can be simpliﬁed as signing a message
by the sender and then verifying the authenticity and integrity of
the message at the receiver’s end. Certain authentication requirements such as low computational overhead, strong and scalable
authentication, eﬃcient and scalable certiﬁcate revocation must be
addressed and solved to ensure secure communication in VANETs.
Ensuring privacy of vehicles (drivers) is one of the many challenging issues for which an eﬃcient solution needs to be found
because an adversary could otherwise trace a vehicle’s traveling
routes by capturing and analyzing it’s messages [8] and identify
the vehicle (driver) which may have drastic consequences for the
drivers. To address this issue, many researchers have proposed
protocols wherein vehicles use pseudonyms instead of their real
ids in communication while at the same time enabling authori-

ties to extract the real ids from pseudonyms to trace and punish misbehaving vehicles. Such protocols are called conditional
privacy-preserving protocols. Assigning pseudonyms to vehicles
and changing them frequently is one of the strategies used to
ensure privacy of vehicles. To maximize privacy, vehicles must
change pseudonyms more frequently although the frequency of
such change remains debatable. Factors such as availability and
storage size play an important role in determining the rate at
which pseudonym should be changed. A vast majority of the papers in the literature addressing security, authentication, and privacy use a TA for obtaining and loading OBUs and RSUs with security parameters such as keys, certiﬁcates, and pseudonyms (Fig. 2).
Securing VANETs from attacks from malicious vehicles is also
a challenging issue due to the dynamic nature of network formation [9]. Some of these attacks may be carried out by nodes inside
the network (i.e., nodes that have been already authorized to be a
member of the VANET); other attacks may be carried out by vehicles that do not belong to the VANET. Among the existing types
of attacks, message spooﬁng, message replay attack, message integrity attack, impersonation attack, Denial of Service (DoS) attack
and movement tracking attack are the most common.
Traditional approaches for secure and authenticated message
dissemination, largely based on message encryption and key management, can only guarantee secure message exchange between
known source and destination pairs. These approaches cannot be
directly applied in the context of VANETs due to the dynamic nature of VANETs. Message dissemination in VANETs can also be vul-
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nerable to insider attacks (i.e., attacks from authenticated VANET
members), who may tamper the content of the disseminated messages or send malicious messages. Thus, ensuring the integrity
and authenticity of the messages transmitted in VANETs is an important issue. In this paper, we present a survey of some of the
research works done in the last ten years addressing privacy, authentication and secure message dissemination in VANETs.
For convenience, we summarize below some of the frequently
used acronyms in this paper:
CCN: Content-Centric Networks
CRL: Certiﬁcate Revocation List
D2D: Device to Device
DSRC: Dedicated Short Range Communication
DTNs: Delay Tolerant Networks
ECC: Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDSA: Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
GUID: Global Unique Identiﬁer
IBC: Identity Based Cryptography
ITS: Intelligent Transportation System
IVC: Inter-Vehicle Communication (same as V2V)
KDC: Key Distribution Center (same as TA)
LBS: Location-Based Service
MLGS: Message-Linkable Group Signature
OBU: On Board Unit
PKI: Public Key Infrastructure
QoS: Quality of Service
RSU: Road Side Unit
SDN: Software Deﬁned Network
TA: Trusted Authority
TCP: Transmission Control Protocol
TMKM: Topology Matching Key Management
USDOT: United States Department of Transportation
V2I: Vehicle to Infrastructure
V2V: Vehicle to Vehicle
VANET: Vehicular Ad-hoc Network
VHN: Vehicular Heterogeneous Networks
VPKI: Vehicular Public Key Infrastructure
1.1. Contributions of this work
The main objective of this work is to provide a comprehensive
review of the papers published in the last ten years which have
proposed privacy and authentication solutions in VANETs. Existing
survey papers focus mostly on speciﬁc issues or are general surveys about VANETs. We do not have a comprehensive survey of the
papers published in the last ten years addressing privacy, authentication and secure message dissemination in VANETs. This work
tries to ﬁll this gap. In this survey, we classiﬁed the protocols into
different categories based on the problems addressed as well as
tools and techniques used to solve these problems; we also do a
comparative study of the protocols in each category. Our classiﬁcation of the protocols is not strict because a protocol may belong
to two or more categories. For example, a protocol that belongs to
“Protocols based on Smart Cards and Tamper-proof Devices” category may also belong to “Protocols Using Bilinear Pairing based
Cryptography” also but not conversely. This work would also serve
as a suitable reference for researchers working on privacy, authentication and secure message dissemination in VANETs.
1.2. Organization of the paper
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we
discuss some of the existing survey papers on VANETs in general
and also the survey papers related to privacy, security and authentication in VANETs. In Section 3, we present our survey of papers
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published in the last ten years, addressing privacy, authentication
and secure message dissemination in VANETs. We discuss some
open issues and future directions in Section 4. Finally, we make
some concluding remarks in Section 5.
2. Related surveys on VANETs architectures, privacy, security and
authentication in VANETs
Many survey papers related to VANETs have been published in
the literature. In this section we discuss some of these survey papers published over the last 10 years.
Hartenstein and Laberteaux [2] present a comprehensive study
on VANET applications, requirements, topology, channel features
and models. The study also covers a brief introduction to the architectures, protocols and standards for VANETs. It also discusses the
main challenges facing the widespread implementation of VANETs.
A survey on the communication and performance requirements
of Inter-Vehicle Communication (IVC) protocols is presented by
Willke et al. [10]. They discuss the relevance of different protocols
for speciﬁc types of IVC applications. Based on this relevance, applications are grouped into classes that share a common communication organization and performance requirements. They listed
four types of IVC applications – “General Information Services, Vehicle Safety Information Services, Individual motion control and
Group Motion Control”. Karagiannis et al. [11] describe VANET
application requirements, use cases, architectures, protocols, challenges and some solutions to address these challenges. They primarily discuss the scope and objectives of several ITS projects,
architectures and standards in the USA, Europe and Japan. Challenges in the area of anonymity and adaptive privacy, data centric
trust and veriﬁcation, geographical addressing, designing reliable
message forwarding algorithm are also mentioned. Riley et al. [12]
discuss protocols that use group based and non-group based authentication techniques based on both symmetric and asymmetric
cryptography.
Zeadally et al. [5] discuss recent research in the areas of “routing, broadcasting, Quality of Service (QoS) and security in VANETs”.
They also present a comparative study of the following VANET simulators: SUMO, MOVE, TranNs, VanetMobiSim, and NCTuns. Current
research status, challenges and potentials of VANETs are brieﬂy
described by Eze et al. [13]. They discuss how kinematic information of vehicles can be used to support security of communicating
vehicles. A vehicle’s recent location, position, velocity and acceleration are derived from the kinematic information exchange in
V2V and V2I communication. Secure, authentic and reliable exchange of kinematic information is a challenging issue for both
safety and non-safety related VANET applications. Whaiduzzaman
et al. [14] present a survey of vehicular cloud computing along
with its application, cloud formation, key management technique,
inter-cloud communication and various privacy and security issues
related to inter-cloud communication. They argue that vehicular
cloud computing is feasible and more cost-effective compared to
normal cloud computing. Mokhtar and Azab [9] present an hierarchical structure of various network layers for VANETs and potential
attacks in these layers with corresponding counter measures. Petit
et al. [15] discuss the life-cycle of pseudonyms based on asymmetric key, identity, group signature and symmetric key. They also
present a qualitative comparison of these four types of pseudonym
schemes. Lu and Li [16] present a survey of privacy-preserving
authentication of nodes and messages. They classify the various
privacy-preserving authentication schemes based on the cryptographic protocols used and the privacy preservation mechanisms
used in these schemes. Then they discuss the open issues in this
area. Gerla et al. [17] survey content distribution protocols for
VANETs.

4

D. Manivannan et al. / Vehicular Communications 25 (2020) 100247

Table 1
Summary of some of the recent survey papers on VANETs.
Paper

Year published

Area(s) Surveyed

Willke et al. [10]

2009

A survey of Inter-Vehicle Communication(IVC) Protocols and their applications.

Karagiannis et al. [11]

2011

A survey of vehicular networking application requirements, use cases, architectures, protocols,
challenges and solutions.

Riley et al. [12]

2011

A survey of different authentication schemes for VANETs.

Zeadally et al. [5]

2012

A survey of routing techniques, Quality of Service (QoS) and security in VANETs.

Eze et al. [13]

2014

A survey of current research status, challenges, and potentials of VANETs.

Whaiduzzaman et al. [14]

2014

A survey of vehicular cloud computing.

Mokhtar et al. [9]

2015

A survey of security features, challenges, and attacks on VANETs.

Petit et al. [15]

2015

A survey of pseudonym schemes in VANETs.

Lu and Li [16]

2016

A Survey of privacy-preserving authentication schemes.

Azees et al. [18]

2016

A survey of security services in VANETs.

Sakizet al. [24]

2017

A survey of attacks and detection mechanism in VANETs and IoV.

Manvi et al. [25]

2017

A survey of authentication schemes for VANETs.

Bernardini et al. [19]

2017

A survey of security and privacy issues in VANETs.

Taimur et al. [23]

2017

A survey of certiﬁcate revocation techniques and protocols for VANETs.

Hasrouny et al. [26]

2017

A survey of security challenges and solutions for VANETs.

Ferrag et al. [27]

2017

Survey on privacy

Asuquo et al. [28]

2018

A survey of privacy-enhancing schemes and cryptography approaches for LBS in VANETs and
mobile communication.

Lu et al. [30]

2019

A survey on authentication and location privacy protection mechanisms based on pseudonyms

Azees et al. [18] provide a detailed overview of security threats,
solutions and related works on availability, conﬁdentiality, authentication, data integrity and non-repudiation in VANETs. They also
propose a new secure dual authentication and key management
technique for eﬃcient communication in VANETs. Bernardini et
al. [19] discuss the security and safety requirements for modern
cars, architecture and safety features of AUTomotive Open System
ARchitecture (AUTOSAR) [20]. They also provide a survey of research work done in intra-vehicle communication and inter-vehicle
communication, and also discuss security and privacy issues related to these communications. The Controller Area Network with
Flexible Data rate (CAN-FD) [21], proposed by Gmph is considered
to be suitable for intra-vehicle networking. Woo and Jo [22] propose a security architecture for CAN-FD.
Khan et al. [23] discussed a classiﬁcation of different Certiﬁcate
Revocation List (CRL) distribution techniques using Vehicular Public Key Infrastructure (VPKI) and metrics to evaluate them. Sakiz
and Sen [24] discuss existing works on threats and prevention
mechanisms; most of the solutions discussed are for OBU-based
communications which means that they do not need any dedicated infrastructure such as RSUs. They also point out that Sybil
attack is widely addressed by researchers while other types of attacks are not very much addressed. Manvi and Tangade [25] focus
on different authentication mechanisms presented in the literature
and discuss their pros and cons. Hasrouny et al. [26] present a
survey of VANETs security characteristics, architecture, protocols,
challenges and solutions. They also present a comparative study of
some of the existing security solutions. Ferrag et al. [27] present a
critical survey of privacy-preserving protocols presented in the literature for mobile social networks and vehicular social networks.
They survey the research works on location privacy, anonymity,
and content-oriented privacy. Asuquo et al. [28] outline different
security and privacy requirements, attacks and adversary models
in Location Based Services (LBS) along with various metrics for
evaluating location privacy in VANETs. They also discuss different
privacy enhancing approaches presented in recent research works
on ensuring location privacy in both VANETs and mobile networks.
Boualouache et al. [29] discuss various pseudonym changing strategies presented in the literature and compare the strength and
weaknesses of these pseudonym changing strategies. Lu et al. [30]
presented a survey focusing on authentication schemes and location privacy protection mechanisms based on pseudonyms. They

also present a survey of various trust management models and
also give an update on the latest mobility and network simulators. None of the above surveys has presented a comprehensive
survey of articles published in the last ten years addressing privacy, authentication and secure message dissemination in VANETs.
In this paper, we try to ﬁll this gap. Table 1 summarizes the areas
surveyed by the survey papers that we discussed above.
3. Privacy, conditional privacy, authentication and secure
message dissemination in VANETs
In this section, we group the protocols addressing Privacy, Authentication and Secure Message Dissemination in VANETs into
different classes and discuss the beneﬁts and drawbacks of the
protocols in each class. As we mentioned earlier, it is not possible to provide a strict classiﬁcation of the protocols because some
protocols may fall into two or more different classes. This is only a
broad classiﬁcation.
3.1. Secure content distribution and advertisement dissemination in
VANETs
RSUs can offer various services such as Internet access, real
time traﬃc data access, maps, and media ﬁles download and software updates download through high speed networks. Vehicle’s
can make use of these services by connecting to the RSUs through
VANET. Many of the research works on this type of serviceoriented vehicular communication did not take data security and
location privacy of the users into consideration. Recently, advertisements of commercial products to vehicles has been identiﬁed
as a promising application for VANETs. But dissemination of advertisements can be ineffective and insecure in the presence of noncooperative selﬁsh vehicles and malicious vehicles. In this subsection, we discuss the protocols designed for secure content distribution/downloading and advertisement dissemination in VANETs.
Huang et al. [31] propose an Anonymous Batch Authentication
and Key Agreement (ABAKA) scheme to facilitate the deployment
of value-added services in VANETs. To support value-added services provided by Service Providers (SPs), communication between
vehicles and SPs should be secure and the message authentication process should be eﬃcient. ABAKA addresses this issue and
allows multiple vehicles to be authenticated in batches, rather
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Table 2
Summary of the protocols for secure content distribution.
Paper

Year published

Focus area(s) of the paper

Method(s) used

Strengths and Weaknesses

Huang et al. [31]

2011

Authentication and secure content
distribution

Generates pseudonyms similar to Lu
et al. [32]; ECC.

Pseudonymous batched authentication;
ensures secure communication between
vehicles and service providers.

Lee et al. [34,35]

2012

Secure incentive-based dissemination
of commercial ads

PKI and Signature-Seeking Drive (SSD)
framework

Prevents dissemination of false or dummy
ads; incentives may result in
overspending.

Silva et al. [36]

2016

Secure content distribution in
VANETs

Trajectory aware content distribution.

Satisﬁes more users’ interest faster than
typical CCNs [37,38].

than one vehicle at a time. It allows the creation of pseudonyms
and the respective private keys for each vehicle to ensure conditional privacy. Similar to the approach taken by Lu et al. [32], the
Tamper-Proof Device (TPD) can generate private keys based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) and the associated pseudonyms
and store them. Requiring every vehicle to have a tamper-proof
device installed may limit the participation of vehicles in VANET.
Moreover, TPDs manufactured may be able to resist known attacks,
but not necessarily all future attacks; TPDs could also be susceptible to side-channel attacks mentioned in [33].
Lee et al. [34,35] propose a Signature-Seeking Drive (SSD)
which makes the dissemination of advertisements (ads) secure but
also suggest providing incentives in the form of virtual cash to
motivate non-cooperative vehicles to participate in ad dissemination. Many of the existing incentive schemes rely on tamper-proof
hardware, but this scheme leverages on the public key infrastructure to provide incentives securely for cooperating nodes in both
single level and multilevel transactions. In this scheme, the Vehicular Authority (VA) is in charge of advertisement authorization and
maintenance. The VA also maintains the records of all the transactions. After a vehicle receives an advertisement, it veriﬁes the
authenticity of the received ad and sends back its signed receipt to
the sender of the ad. Thus, this scheme prevents the dissemination
of false or dummy ads. However, when the number of co-operating
vehicles increases, this may result in overspending on incentives
and hence this approach may not be proﬁtable to advertisers.
The Trajectory-aware Content distribution strategy (TraC), proposed by Silva et al. [36], uses Content-Centric Networks (CCN) [37,
38] to build persistent proactive caches in RSUs. TraC is based
on users’ trajectory to increase the probability of content delivery, which was not previously taken into account in the CCN based
research works in VANET scenarios. In this scheme, RSUs can proactively download the content requested from the Internet even
before the arrival of a vehicle within the zone of an RSU. Thus the
vehicle does not need to wait for the content to be downloaded
when it arrives in the zone of an RSU. Triangular Area Forwarding (TAF) and Distance Minimization Forwarding (DMF) techniques,
and a neighborhood discovery protocol are used to forward interest
of vehicles to RSUs. The performance of TraC with respect to the
content delivery ratio, and how fast content and interests are satisﬁed is evaluated in the urban, highway and a realistic rush-hour
(using Cologne dataset [39]) scenario. Their evaluation shows that
TraC satisﬁes more users’ interests and faster compared to typical CCNs in general, and satisﬁes 50% more interests in the urban
scenario.
Ramakrishnan et al. [40] present a cluster-based algorithm for
broadcasting emergency messages in VANETs. They ﬁrst form clusters and the cluster-heads are responsible for intra-cluster management. They also use MAC layer broadcast protocols for increasing
the reliability of emergency message dissemination. Nkenyereye et
al. [41] present a vehicular cloud based traﬃc data dissemination
protocol. He et al. [42] present a dropbox based approach for disseminating messages in VANETs. The dropbox based approach can
cause delay in message dissemination and hence the receiver may

not be able to get the messages on time. To address this problem,
the authors ﬁrst present a theoretical framework for estimating the
delay; then they present a dropbox deployment algorithm. They
use dimension enlargement and dynamic programming to design
dropbox deployment algorithm.
Table 2 presents a summary of the protocols discussed in this
section.
3.2. Protocols that use ID-based signatures and group signatures for
authentication of messages
Generally, the Trusted Authority (TA) is responsible for issuing security parameters, such as keys, certiﬁcates and pseudonyms
to vehicles. When the TA detects (or is informed by an RSU) a
malicious vehicle, it revokes the vehicle’s certiﬁcates (generally,
one certiﬁcate for each pseudonym) and informs all other vehicles
about it. This is a centralized approach which does not scale well.
Moreover, as the CRL grows, the message authentication overhead
increases. In this subsection, we discuss some solutions proposed
for solving these problems using ID-based signatures and ID-based
cryptography [43–45].
Jiang et al. [46] design a signature scheme and a signature veriﬁcation scheme that helps the RSUs in verifying the signatures of
the messages including beacon messages sent by vehicles within
their transmission range fast and also identify bogus messages.
This requires dense deployment of RSUs. Their scheme is based
on Hess’s signature scheme [47] and ID-based encryption based on
Weil pairing [45]. Their scheme requires the signatures of the messages from all vehicles within the transmission range of an RSU to
be stored in a binary authentication tree (BAT) structure to facilitate fast veriﬁcation of signatures. Under this scheme, the RSU can
quickly distinguish the bogus messages from the authentic ones.
Therefore, this scheme can tolerate, to a large extent, message
ﬂooding attacks. The TA is responsible for generating the keys and
the associated pseudonyms and distributing them to the respective
vehicles and the RSUs. The TA is also responsible for identifying
the real id of malicious vehicles (RSU or law enforcement agencies
can report pseudonyms vehicles suspected to be malicious to the
TA) based on their pseudonym.
Zhang et al. [48] introduced an on-the-ﬂy group creation approach in which the RSUs create and maintain groups. This allows
vehicles to join the group maintained by the nearby RSU and also
anonymously broadcast authenticated messages to vehicles within
its group. However, authenticated message dissemination among
vehicles in different groups is not addressed. Their approach is
conditional privacy-preserving and it assumes RSUs are densely deployed and trustworthy.
Xie et al. [49] develop a Privacy-Aware Monitoring System
(PAMS) that acts as an aggregate query processor to protect the
location privacy of vehicles by making the IDs of cars anonymous.
The system aggregates vehicle IDs into partial IDs. The key idea is
based on k-anonymity [50] in which every record released shares
identifying information with at least k-1 other individuals. Zhang
et al. [51] propose an ID-based Batch Veriﬁcation (IBV) scheme.
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Batch veriﬁcation allows veriﬁcation of signatures received in a
time window faster compared to verifying each signature one after the other. Their scheme uses improved Camenisch-Lysyanskaya
(CL) signature [52] to verify a batch of signatures σ1 , σ2 , ..., σn of
n messages M 1 , M 2 , ..., M n from n different vehicles V 1 , V 2 , ..., V n
all at once instead of one at a time. The veriﬁcation involves checking if one equation involving the parameters in the signatures is
satisﬁed. The cost of computation involved in verifying if the equation is true is comprised of n multiplications n MapToPoint hash,
3n additions, and n one-way hash operations. Thus, the veriﬁcation time for n signatures is a constant times n. This scheme is not
resilient to DoS attacks such as Dummy Message Jamming (DMJ)
attack. Moreover, Zhang et al’s. [51] scheme can not mitigate replay attack and it does not guarantee signature non-repudiation.
Lee and Lai [53] address the above drawbacks of Zhang et
al’s. [51] scheme and extend Zhang et al.’s scheme by adding
pseudo identity generation, message signing, and message veriﬁcation techniques. However, the performance of this approach may
degrade when the number of invalid signatures increases. Bayat
et al. [54] analyze the authentication scheme for VANETs introduced by Lee et al. [53] and show how that scheme is vulnerable
to the impersonation attack so that a malicious user can generate
a valid signature on behalf of the other vehicles. Based on this observation, Bayat et al. [54] proposed an improved scheme which
addresses this drawback of Lee et al.’s [53] scheme.
In the decentralized group authentication protocol presented by
Zhang et al. [55], RSUs are responsible for maintaining and managing the group of vehicles within its transmission range for supporting secure communication between them. The basic idea behind
their scheme is as follows: the central TA uses bilinear pairing for
generating keys and issuing certiﬁcates to vehicles and RSUs. The
TA also maintains the CRL. A Tracing Manager (TM) is responsible
for tracing malicious vehicles. When a vehicle passes a nearby RSU,
it uses signcryption [56] to send an encrypted request to the RSU
for a group key. After receiving the group key, it uses the group
signature scheme [57] to sign and send messages to members in
its group. However, authenticated message dissemination between
vehicles in different groups is not addressed.
For linking a message, signed using group key, to the originator of the message in the group, cryptographic technique such
as message-linkable group signature (MLGS) [58] is used. Wu et
al. [59] also propose a message-linkable group signature approach
for thwarting Sybil attacks in VANETs. The priori and posteriori
countermeasures used for authenticating messages are based on
adaptive threshold authentication (in which a vehicle trusts a message only if the number of anonymous vehicles endorsing the
message is greater than or equal to the predetermined threshold) which helps in speeding up veriﬁcation and validation of a
large number of messages in a single batch without compromising
security. Xiong et al. [60] propose a scheme for managing communication among a group of vehicles effectively and spontaneously.
Their scheme is based on revokable ring signatures proposed by
Liu et al. [61]. This scheme allows only valid ring members to generate a ring signature for a message. In addition, trusted authorities
are responsible for tracing and revoking the real signer. However,
message veriﬁcation overhead increases when the number of vehicles in the group grows.
Lo et al. [62] use ID-based signature and Elliptic Curve Cryptography in their conditional privacy-preserving authentication
scheme for communication between vehicles and RSUs. Their
scheme supports batch veriﬁcation to improve throughput. They
show that their scheme has better performance compared to some
of the existing pseudonym-based authentication schemes. Biswas
et al. [63] present a scheme for authenticating safety messages
broadcasted by RSUs. Their scheme is also based on ID-based signatures [43,44] and uses proxy signatures based on Elliptic Curve

Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA), the digital signature algorithm speciﬁed in IEEE 1609.2 standard [64] for message authentication. They compare the overhead incurred by their algorithm
in signing and veriﬁcation with that of a few other existing algorithms. Among the ﬁve algorithms compared, their algorithm is
the only one which uses both ID-based and proxy-based signature
schemes and yields comparable performance.
Chim et al. [65] propose a software based Secure and Privacy
Enhancing Communication Scheme (SPECS) which relies on IDBased Cryptography (IBC) with bilinear pairing. In this scheme,
after an initial handshaking with the nearby RSU, vehicles belonging to the same group can communicate securely without the aid
of the RSU. They make use of two Bloom ﬁlters [75], namely, positive and negative ﬁlters to reduce the message overhead and false
positives during message authentication. Positive ﬁlter stores the
authentic vehicle’s hash value of pseudonym and messages, and
the negative ﬁlter stores the hash value of pseudonym and messages of vehicles that have not been authenticated. It has low
communication overhead and it also has an effective batch veriﬁcation success rate. However, it can be vulnerable to impersonation
attack.
Hsiao et al. [66] present two broadcast authentication schemes
(FastAuth and SelAuth) to deal with the signature ﬂooding problem
(i.e., reduce the computation overhead involved in verifying a large
number of signatures in a short amount of time). The FastAuth
protocol is based on chained Huffman hash trees (a data structure
designed by them) for securing periodic single-hop beacon messages. This scheme supports a one-time signature scheme whose
signature veriﬁcation is claimed to be 50 times faster and signature generation is claimed to be 20 times faster than using Elliptic
Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA), the Digital Signature
Algorithm speciﬁed in IEEE 1609.2 standard [64] for authentication. The other protocol, namely, the SelAuth protocol, helps in
isolating malicious nodes faster by selecting messages that need
to be veriﬁed before forwarding. They use a selection algorithm
to distinguish benign neighbors from malicious neighbors which
helps in restricting the spread of messages with invalid signatures
to a small area. They also show that SelAuth incurs 10% - 35% additional computational overhead compared to other closely related
schemes while containing 99% of invalid signatures to one hop.
They only focus on broadcast authentication and not point-to-point
message authentication.
Wasef and Shen [72,73] try to reduce the time involved in
checking the CRLs during message authentication; they use the
keyed Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC), wherein the key
used to calculate the HMAC is shared only between non-revoked
OBUs. However, vehicles must still verify the validity of certiﬁcate and signature because it still uses a TA for generating and
distributing secret keys and certiﬁcates to all OBUs. Certiﬁcate revocation is triggered by the TA which involves revoking the current
secret key and securely distributing a new secret key to all nonrevoked OBUs.
The dual authentication and key management technique presented by Vijayakumar et al. [67] is based on Chinese Remainder
Theorem (CRT) where both hash code and ﬁngerprints of each
participating vehicle are used for dual authentication. In their approach, the TA divides the users into two groups, namely Primary
and Secondary, and then generates two different group keys for
these two different groups of users. It provides service to vehicles’ users on the basis of a Service Level Agreement (SLA). The
shared group keys are refreshed when a new user joins the group
or an existing group member leaves the group, thus making this
scheme resistant to forward secrecy and backward secrecy attack.
It is shown that this scheme is computationally more eﬃcient
compared to some of the other existing schemes, such as Chinese
Remainder Group Key (CRGK) [76] and Key-tree Chinese Remain-
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Table 3
Brief summary of the protocols that use ID-based signatures and/or group signatures for authentication of messages.
Paper

Year published

Focus area(s) of the paper

Method(s) used

Strengths and weaknesses

Jiang et al. [46]

2009

Privacy, security and
authentication

Hess’s signature scheme [47] and
ID-based encryption based on Weil
pairing [45]

Bogus message identiﬁcation; batch veriﬁcation;
constructing Binary tree for storing signatures in
dynamic environment; requires dense deployment of
RSUs because authentication of messages is done by
RSUs.

Xie et al. [49]

2010

Privacy aware traﬃc
monitoring

PKI and Euler Histograms (EHs)

Can process a large number of queries effectively and
accurately. Many IDs need to be managed.

Zhang et al. [51]

2011

ID-based batch veriﬁcation

Improved Camenisch-Lysyanskaya
(CL) signature [52]

Reduces message loss ratio and communication
overhead; not resistant to DoS attack.

Bayat et al. [54]

2015

Privacy, security and
authentication

ECC

Addresses a drawback of the protocol presented in [53]
and presents a solution.

Lee and Lai [53]

2013

Eﬃcient veriﬁcation of
messages

Bilinear pairing and batch veriﬁcation
with group testing

Can resist replay attack and non-repudiation attack;
may not be able to detect illegal signatures.

Zhang et al. [55]

2010

Authentication, privacy,
traceability and
conﬁdentiality

Bilinear pairing, group signature [57]
and signcryption [56]

RSUs are responsible for maintaining groups, so
decentralized in some sense; no scalable mechanism to
support broadcast throughout the network;
group-signatures generally have high signature
veriﬁcation and revocation costs.

Wu et al. [59]

2010

Security, privacy and trust
in V2V communication

Bilinear pairing, Message Linkable
Group Signature (MLGS) and
batch-veriﬁcation

Accelerates veriﬁcation of messages; diﬃcult to manage
revocation process.

Xiong et al. [60]

2010

Secure V2V communication

Bilinear pairing and Revocable ring
signatures [61]

Does not require ubiquitous deployment of RSUs;
message veriﬁcation cost may increase as the number of
vehicles grows.

Lo et al. [62]

2011

Authentication, security and
privacy

ID-based signature and ECDSA

Supports batch veriﬁcation.

Biswas et al. [63]

2011

Authentication

ID and Proxy-based signature scheme

Has lower overhead compared to some compared
algorithms; addresses only authentication of RSU
messages.

Chim et al. [65]

2011

Authentication, security and
privacy

Identity Based Cryptography (IBC)
with bilinear pairing

Low overhead and authenticates messages effectively;
can be vulnerable to impersonation attack.

Hsiao et al. [66]

2011

Broadcast authentication

Chained Huffman hash trees (based
on Merkle hash tree and Huffman
tree)

More eﬃcient than ECDSA speciﬁed in IEEE 1609.2
standard; the protocol for authenticating beacons will
not work correctly if beacons are missed.

der Theorem (KCRT) [77]. However, they do not address the privacy
of users in their work.
Zhang et al. [70] present a conditional privacy-preserving authentication protocol based on ID-based aggregate signatures and
bilinear pairing based cryptography. Their approach allows hierarchical aggregation of signatures and batch veriﬁcation. Their hierarchical aggregation technique allows re-aggregation which reduces transmission and storage overhead. Moreover, it has lower
waiting time for aggregation compared to some of the other approaches presented in the literature.
Shao et al. [68] use group signatures and threshold authentication (in which a message is accepted by a vehicle only after it
has been authenticated by a threshold number of other vehicles)
to reduce the overhead related to downloading and checking CRL.
It uses bilinear pairing based cryptography. Since RSUs serve as
group managers, if RSUs are compromised, the group keys could
be revealed. The location of vehicles can be traced by RSUs in
this approach. The privacy-preserving authentication protocol presented by Zhang et al. [69] uses multiple trusted authorities (i.e.,
a central trusted authority and RSUs which are assumed to be
trusted as well) and ID-based aggregate signatures. The same authors also present two other protocols for message authentication
based on aggregated signatures [70,78]. However, they do not compare the performance of this protocol [69] with these two other
protocols [70,78].
Lai et al. [71] discuss the security challenges, requirements and
beneﬁts of group communication in Software Deﬁned Network
(SDN) based 5G-VANETs. They propose a Secure Group Mobility management Framework (SGMF) for group-oriented vehicular
communication based on modiﬁed IPsec packet and an addressing

method described in [79]. Their scheme performs better compared
to some of the existing mobility management schemes with respect to hand over signaling overhead and latency. However, the
hand over signaling cost may increase as the density and mobility
of vehicles increase.
Cui et al. [74] propose a Secure Privacy-preserving Authentication scheme using Cuckoo Filter (SPACF). Their goal is to achieve
higher success rate than some of the previously proposed schemes
in the batch veriﬁcation phase. Cuckoo ﬁlter and binary search
are used to accomplish their goal. SPACF is shown to be more efﬁcient than some of the previous schemes because it is pairing
free and does not use map-to-point hash functions. However, this
ID-based scheme still suffers from inherent key escrow problem
despite eliminating much of the limitations of Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and ID-based Batch Veriﬁcation (IBV).
Table 3 and 4 summarize the strengths and weaknesses of the
protocols discussed in this section.
3.3. Protocols that use RSUs for authentication and/or key distribution
Some protocols presented in the literature, oﬄoad some work
(such as message authentication, packet forwarding) from vehicles
to RSUs and/or some work (such as key management and CRL distribution, detecting and reporting suspicious vehicles) from TA to
RSUs. In this subsection we discuss protocols belonging to this category.
The RSU-aided message authentication scheme, called RAISE,
proposed by Zhang et al. [80] oﬄoads the overhead involved in
message authentication to RSUs. This requires dense deployment
of RSUs. Vehicles establish a shared key with the RSU using Diﬃe-
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Table 4
Brief summary of the protocols that use ID-based signatures and/or group signatures for authentication of messages continued.
Vijayakumar et al. [67]

2016

Secure data transmission in
VANETs

Vehicular Public Key Infrastructure
(VPKI) and dual authentication and
key management techniques

Provides resistance against forward secrecy and
backward secrecy attacks; takes single broadcast
message to get the updated group key; does not address
location privacy.

Shao et al. [68]

2016

Privacy, security, and
authentication

Bilinear pairing; group signatures;
threshold based authentication

Facilitates revocation, unforgeability, anonymity, and
traceability; overhead due to the use of bilinear pairing;
group-signatures generally have higher signature
veriﬁcation and revocation costs; since RSUs serve as
group managers if RSUs are compromised, the group
keys could be revealed. The location of the vehicles can
be tracked by RSUs in this approach.

Zhang et al. [69]

2017

Privacy, security, and
authentication

Bilinear pairing based cryptography;
multiple trusted authorities; ID-based
aggregate signature technique for
authentication

Certiﬁcate distribution is not centralized; Bilinear
pairing based cryptography generally has high
computational overhead.

Zhang et al. [70]

2016

Privacy, security and
authentication

ID-based aggregate signatures;
hierarchical aggregation of signatures
and bilinear pairing based
cryptography

Signature aggregation and re-aggregation helps in
reducing transmission and storage overhead; waiting
time needed for aggregation is also reduced compared
to some other protocols; bilinear pairing based
cryptography has high computation overhead.

Lai et al. [71]

2017

Secure group
communication in SDN
based 5G-VANETs

PKI; secure group management and
group handover

Provides better group hand over authentication in terms
of hand over signaling overhead and latency; cost may
increase with increase in density and mobility of
vehicles.

Wasef and Shen [72,73]

2009

Fast message authentication

Bilinear pairing

Claims to make the CRL checking process faster; High
overheads involved in distributing a secret key to all
non-revoked OBUs.

Cui et al. [74]

2017

Privacy, security and
Authentication

Cuckoo ﬁlter and binary search
methods

It is pairing free and does not use map-to-point hash
functions; suffers from inherent key escrow problem.

Hellman algorithm. They also take the k-anonymity [50] approach
to prevent an adversary from associating a message with a particular vehicle to ensure the privacy of the vehicles.
The message authentication scheme proposed by Zhang et
al. [81] is an extension of the scheme presented in [80]; this extension includes a method for vehicles to cooperatively authenticate
messages in the absence of an RSU. Hao et al. [82,141] present
a distributed key management framework and also a method for
cooperative message authentication for speeding up message authentication. Sun et al. [83] also present a group signature and
identity-based signature scheme for secure and authenticated message dissemination. Papadimitratos et al. [84] also present a distributed method for distributing CRLs using RSUs to reduce the
overhead involved in CRL distribution.
Lu et al. [85] propose a Social-based PRivacy-preserving packet
forwardING (SPRING) protocol which prevents packet analysis attack, packet tracing attack, black hole attack and grey hole attack
in vehicular Delay Tolerant Networks (DTNs). This protocol relies
on placing RSUs at high social intersections and using group signatures to prevent the disclosure of identity of senders, target vehicles and relaying vehicles. The RSUs help in forwarding packets
between vehicles which helps in reducing packet loss.
Shim’s [86] Conditional Privacy-preserving Authentication
Scheme (CPAS), is a secure conditional privacy-preserving scheme
for V2I communications. It uses bilinear pairing based cryptography to generate and store key parameters and ID-based signatures
for authentication. Their scheme requires RSUs to verify messages
sent by vehicles in batches to speed up the message authentication
process. They do not address V2V communications.
The Logical Key Hierarchy (LKH) based schemes [87–89] and
Topology Matching Key Management (TMKM) based schemes [90–
92] for Group Key Management (GKM) wherein all the key management functionalities are handled by the Key Distribution Center
(KDC) have re-keying overhead. Park et al. [93] address this problem and propose a Group Key Management (GKM) scheme, called
RSU-based Decentralized Key Management (RDKM). RDKM is based
on versakey framework [94] for secure vehicular multicast commu-

nication. In this scheme, part of the GKM functions are oﬄoaded to
RSUs in a distributed manner. For eﬃcient operation of this protocol, the authors suggest placing RSUs at the intersection of streets.
For forming groups, the authors suggest placing vehicles within
the region of an RSU in the same group. This helps an RSU manage
the group keys eﬃciently. Their performance evaluation shows that
this approach results in approximately 60% to 80% reduction in
communication overhead compared to some of the existing GKMbased schemes. They also propose a new performance measure
namely, Group Key Management Overhead (GKMO), and observe
a rapid increase in GKMO for both LKH and TMKM schemes compared to the RDKM scheme. However, RDKM requires more storage
space to store information about keys at each vehicle compared to
the LKH and TMKM schemes.
In a Sybil attack, a malicious node can use multiple identities
and inject false messages into the network. Zhou et al. [98] propose a protocol, called Privacy Preserving Detection of Abuses of
Pseudonyms ( P 2 DAP), to detect Sybil attacks. In their scheme, the
Department of Motor Vehicles is used as the TA to provide a pool
of pseudonyms to each vehicle and releases part of its workload to
RSUs as follows. Two-level hashing of every pseudonym is generated where the key of the ﬁrst-level hash is known to the RSUs to
identify whether the pseudonyms belong to the same group of vehicles. The second-level hash key is known only to the TA to map
each pseudonym to an individual vehicle. Each time an RSU ﬁnds
suspicious pseudonyms, it reports this incident to the TA for veriﬁcation. But the generation and management of a large number of
pseudonyms can be costly.
The authentication and key establishment scheme for V2V and
V2I communications, presented by Li et al. [95], is also based on
ID-based public-key cryptography, blind signatures [100,101], and
one-way hash chain. The blind signature scheme used in their
scheme allows vehicles to communicate with the RSUs to access
the services provided by them without revealing their real identities, location, and so on. They use TA for populating the OBUs
with the necessary secret key, group key and pseudo id oﬄine or
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Table 5
Summary of the protocols that use RSUs for authentication and/or key distribution.
Paper

Year published

Focus area(s) of the paper

Method(s) used

Strengths and weaknesses

Li et al. [95]

2008

Location privacy and
authentication

ID-based public-key cryptography,
blind signature, and one-way hash
chain

Solves location privacy, anonymity problem; uses a
central trusted third party, which is not scalable.

Zhang et al. [80,81]

2008

Privacy, security and
authentication

RSU-aided message authentication,
cooperative message authentication,
Diﬃe-Hellman algorithm and
k-anonymity

Oﬄoads the overhead involved in message
authentication to RSUs; low communication
overhead. Diﬃe-Hellman protocol is prone to
man-in-the middle attack; vehicles still need to be
pre-loaded with public keys; widespread deployment
of RSUs is necessary.

Lin et al. [96]

2008

Privacy, security and
authentication

Uses TA to get (public, private) keys;
TESLA [97] hash chains for message
authentication

Aims to reduce the overhead involved in certiﬁcate
generation and distribution.

Lu et al. [85]

2010

Secure packet forwarding in
vehicular DTNs and privacy

RSU assisted packet forwarding;
Bilinear pairing

Provides high packet delivery ratio, preserves
conditional privacy and resists packet tracing attack,
packet analysis attack, and black (grey) hole attacks;
ignores mobility of vehicles and ﬂuctuations in traﬃc.

Park et al. [93]

2011

Distributed key
management

PKI and RSU-based key management

Reduces re-keying overhead; can have high storage
overhead to store a large number of keys.

Zhou et al. [98]

2011

Privacy and security; Sybil
Attack Detection

Distributed passive overhearing by
RSUs; PKI based pseudonym
assignment

Detects Sybil attacks with low overhead and delay.

Shim’s [86]

2012

Privacy and authenticated
V2I communication

ID-based cryptography; bilinear
pairing based cryptography for key
generation

Fast batch veriﬁcation of messages at the RSUs;
vehicles need to be equipped with Tamper-Proof
Devices (TPDs); TPDs could be susceptible to
side-channel attacks.

Bao et al. [99]

2017

Privacy, security and
authentication

TESLA protocol [97]; Bloom
Filters [75]

Uses a new certiﬁcate revocation mechanism.

through a secure secret channel. The methods used are not simple
and moreover using a centralized TA is not scalable.
The secure privacy-preserving protocol presented by Lin et
al. [96] aims to reduce the overhead related to signing and verifying packets based on public key cryptography. They propose attaching a short message authentication code tag with each packet
instead of a signature. As in the TESLA protocol [97], each vehicle
generates a hash chain h1 , h2 , ..., hn from a random seed S; here,
hn = S, and h i = H j −i (h j ) for i < j, where H is a hash function.
Each element in the hash chain is used as key to generate MAC
codes for several packets and the keys are released after a short
delay δ (as in [97]) for the receiver to authenticate the packet.
The privacy-preserving authentication scheme presented by Bao
et al. [99] uses TESLA protocol [97] and Bloom Filters [75]. This
protocol complements the work of Lyu et al. [102] in the following aspects: (i) To preserve privacy, the RSUs assign timestamp
based pseudonyms to vehicles within each group which is determined based on speed, direction and other factors; (ii) In contrast
to TESLA, public key rebroadcasting for new vehicles is done using Bloom Filters; (iii) The certiﬁcate revocation mechanism used
to detect malicious vehicles differs from the one used in [102].
Table 5 summarizes the strengths and weaknesses of the protocols
discussed in this section.
3.4. Protocols using bilinear pairing based cryptography
Lin et al. [103] present a conditional privacy-preserving PKIbased authentication protocol that uses ID-based signatures and
bilinear pairing based cryptography. They use the short group signature scheme, introduced by Boneh et al. [108], for signing messages. It requires each vehicle store the certiﬁcates of all neighboring vehicles. In this approach, the signature veriﬁcation involves
3 × n bilinear pairing operations where n is the number of entries
in the CRL. Moreover, if the group leader is malicious and reveals
the key, the entire group will be compromised.
The conditional privacy-preserving protocol using bilinear pairing based cryptography, presented by Lu et al. [32], aims to address

the overhead related to preloading the OBUs with large number
of pseudonyms to preserve anonymity and the overhead due to
certiﬁcate distribution/veriﬁcation and revocation. To achieve this,
each OBU issues a request for a short-time anonymous key certiﬁcate from the nearby RSU and also checks with the RSU for the
latest CRL. Using the certiﬁcate, the OBU generates pseudonyms
and uses it for communicating anonymously. This would require
RSUs to be deployed densely. Also, creating pseudonyms can cause
delay and the certiﬁcate revocation scheme is not clear.
The Aggregate Privacy Preserving Authentication (APPA) protocol presented by Zhang et al. [78] also uses a TA to issue the initial
bilinear pairing based security parameters and keys to vehicles.
This scheme facilitates aggregating and authenticating messages in
groups. Zhang et al. [105] propose a conditional privacy-preserving
authentication protocol based on self-certiﬁed public key encryption [106], and bilinear pairing. Their aim is to reduce the overhead
involved in generation and distribution of pseudonyms and the
related certiﬁcates. Their approach requires the installation of a
tamper-proof device in each vehicle. Every vehicle that participates
in VANET needs to have a tamper-proof device installed, which
may limit the participation of vehicles in VANETs.
Huang et al.’s [104] scheme, like many others, uses a TA (usually the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV)) to issue the initial
security parameters and keys to vehicles, based on bilinear pairing.
The TA also issues a token that uniquely and anonymously identiﬁes the vehicle. Then, the vehicle uses this token to authenticate
itself to the nearby RSU to get pseudonym token. This pseudonym
token contains only the credentials for the vehicle to generate
pseudonyms. The vehicle then uses this token to generate its own
pseudonyms. After generating pseudonyms, the vehicles use IDbased encryption [45] for exchanging messages securely with other
vehicles. RSUs cannot revoke the certiﬁcate of malicious vehicles
because they do not have private information (such as ID) of the
vehicles. The TA is responsible for revoking the certiﬁcate of malicious vehicles. A vehicle can send a report about malicious vehicles
to nearby RSU and the RSU will send that report to the TA, based
on which the TA can revoke the certiﬁcate of the vehicle.
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Table 6
Summary of protocols using bilinear pairing based cryptography.
Paper

Year published

Focus area(s) of the paper

Method(s) used

Strengths and weaknesses

Lin et al. [103]

2007

Privacy, security and
authentication

PKI-based authentication; Group
signatures

OBUs have to save all the third party certiﬁcates
from the neighboring vehicles which has associated
overheads; if the group leader is malicious and
reveals the key, the entire group is compromised;
cannot eﬃciently deal with compromised vehicles;
group-signatures generally have high signature
veriﬁcation and revocation costs.

Lu et al. [32]

2008

Privacy, security and
authentication

Bilinear pairing based cryptography,
RSU generated pseudonyms

Resolves RSU compromise attack; addresses the
overhead related to pre-loading the OBUs with a
large number of pseudonyms and certiﬁcates; latency
that arises from generation of pseudonym keys by
the RSUs; frequent interactions with the RSUs are
required; requires dense deployment of RSUs; no
clear revocation scheme.

Huang et al. [104]

2011

Authentication, security and
privacy

Bilinear pairing, ID-based
encryption [45]

Can handle message replay/modiﬁcation attacks,
impersonation attacks and deal with compromised
RSUs; the use of ECC has associated overhead.

Zhang et al. [105]

2013

Privacy, security and
authentication

Self-certiﬁed public keys [106] and
bilinear pairing

Proved to be conditional privacy-preserving under
random oracle model.

Azees et al. [107]

2017

Privacy, security and
authentication

Bilinear pairing based cryptography

The authors claim that their scheme for veriﬁcation
of certiﬁcates and signatures is faster and more
eﬃcient than some of the schemes proposed in the
literature.

The protocol proposed by Azees et al. [107] is based on bilinear
pairing based cryptography; the authors claim that it can track malicious/compromised vehicles and RSUs. Although bilinear pairing
based cryptography generally has high computation overhead, their
performance analysis shows that their approach performs better
than seven other protocols with respect to certiﬁcate and signature
veriﬁcation costs. The TA generates pseudonyms (the authors call
them dummy ids) for vehicles and RSUs for preserving anonymity.
Distributing CRLs to vehicles and RSUs is still the responsibility of
the TA. Given the large number of pseudonyms and the associated
certiﬁcates allocated to the vehicles, overheads associated with distributing CRLs as well as verifying the authenticity of messages
using CRLs could be high. However, the authors do not discuss this
overhead.
Table 6 summarizes the strengths and weaknesses of the protocols discussed in this section.
3.5. Protocols that can cope with compromised RSUs and vehicles
Jung et al. [109] propose a conditional privacy-preserving authentication protocol. They claim it is better than the one presented by Lu et al. [32], because it is robust against compromised
RSUs. They use a TA (called membership manager) to assign Message Authentication Code (MAC) keys to OBUs and a group signing key to each RSU. The RSUs generate anonymous certiﬁcates
for vehicles within its region. The TA stores the MAC keys and
the IDs of the vehicles for tracing vehicles in case of disputes.
An OBU requests the nearby RSU for anonymous certiﬁcates for
a given time period; the RSU authenticates the OBU and generates multiple short-term certiﬁcates and sends them to the OBU.
The OBU authenticates the RSU using CRL issued by the TA, accepts the certiﬁcates issued by the RSU, and uses them for sending
authenticated messages. In contrast to many other protocols in the
literature, the conditional privacy-preserving authentication protocol presented by Wang et al. [110] uses decentralized certiﬁcate
authorities and two factor authentication for ensuring privacy and
non-repudiation. This ensures a vehicle’s privacy even if all RSUs
are compromised; this protocol also incurs low computation and
communication overheads compared with some of the existing
protocols.

The primary goal of the pseudonymous authentication scheme
with strong privacy preservation (PASS) presented by Sun et
al. [111] is to keep the length of the CRL linear in terms of
the number of vehicles revoked, not in terms of the number of
pseudonyms assigned as in many other protocols. To accomplish
this, they use hash chain based two-layered pseudonym generation method. This scheme uses a decentralized approach based on
proxy re-signatures for updating the certiﬁcates of vehicles using
RSUs and not the TA. This scheme can also handle compromised
RSUs. Raya et al. [112] present a distributed solution for identifying
and evicting misbehaving or faulty nodes in VANETs. Sedjelmaci
et al. [113] also propose an intrusion detection scheme based on
game theory to detect as well as predict the vehicles that are likely
to misbehave in the future. They claim that their scheme can detect false alerts and Sybil attacks. Table 7 summarizes the protocols
discussed in this section.
Next, we discuss some of the protocols that assume the installation of a tamper-proof device or smart card on each vehicle to
store relevant information such as keys and passwords securely.
3.6. Protocols based on smart cards and tamper-proof devices
Conventional PKI [120] based schemes require each vehicle to
verify the signatures of each of the other vehicles sending messages to it; this results in computational overhead for the OBUs of
the vehicles. To overcome this drawback of PKI based approach, IDbased Batch Veriﬁcation (IBV) [119] scheme was proposed. Under
IBV scheme, an RSU can verify the signatures of multiple messages all at once; so signature veriﬁcation is more eﬃcient under
this approach. The authors use ID-based cryptography for generating private keys associated with pseudo-identities. However, the
IBV [119] scheme depends on the availability of a tamper-proof
hardware device on each vehicle to securely store the system-wide
secret key. Since the system wide secret key is stored on tamperproof hardware of each vehicle, if one of these devices is compromised, the whole system is compromised. Moreover, this does not
ensure privacy of vehicles because real ID of a vehicle could be
traced by other vehicles.
The authentication protocol presented by Ying and Nayak [117,
118] uses dynamic login IDs to preserve privacy. The user gets a
smart card loaded with the vehicle’s pseudonym and password.
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Table 7
Summary of the protocols that can deal with compromised RSUs and/or vehicles.
Paper

Year published

Focus area(s) of the paper

Method(s) used

Strengths and weaknesses

Jung et al. [109]

2009

Privacy and authentication

Bilinear pairing, ID-based group
signature scheme [108] and universal
re-encryption scheme [114]

Robust against compromised RSUs; incurs involved in
issuing certiﬁcates, and CRLs; group-signatures
generally have high signature veriﬁcation and
revocation costs.

Sun et al. [111]

2010

Authentication, security and
privacy

Bilinear pairing, hash chains, Schnorr
signatures [115]

Ensures authentication and privacy; centralized
approach, although RSUs are involved in re-keying;
requires dense deployment of RSUs; the pseudonym
generation method used reduces key management
overhead; bilinear pairing based operations have
associated overhead.

Wang et al. [110]

2016

Privacy, security and
authentication

Decentralized certiﬁcate authority
and two-factor authentication;
bilinear pairing based cryptography

Reduced communication overhead; bilinear pairing
based cryptography incurs high overhead.

Table 8
Summary of protocols that make use of smart-cards and tamper-proof devices.
Paper

Year published

Focus area(s) of the paper

Method(s) used

Strengths and weaknesses

Paruchuri and Durresi [116]

2010

Authentication, privacy, and
security

Smart cards to store keys and
perform encryption/decryption

Requires the use of smart cards.

Ying and Nayak [117]

2014

Privacy, security and
authentication

Login ids are generated
dynamically for ensuring privacy

Smart cards are used for generating login ids
dynamically; it can resist password attacks,
and impersonation attacks; can tolerate smart
card loss; can handle compromised RSUs.

Ying and Nayak [118]

2017

Privacy, security and
authentication

Diﬃe-Helman protocol; smart
cards; hash functions; centralized
trusted authority for loading
smart-cards with login id and
password

Can resist smart card loss attack; can also
resist impersonation and password guessing
attack.

[119]

2008

Authentication, batch
veriﬁcation

ID-based cryptography;
Camenisch-Lysyanskaya (CL)
signature [52]; tamper-proof device

The real ID of the vehicles could be tracked;
vulnerable to impersonation attack.

Smart card inserted into the vehicle’s OBU, authenticates its owner
by asking for the real ID and password and generates dynamic login identity for the user and sends it to the nearby RSU. Upon
receiving this message, the RSU veriﬁes if it is valid, computes
its own dynamic login id and sends its dynamic login id and the
dynamic login id of the vehicle to the TA. The TA computes the
anonymous keys and the corresponding certiﬁcates for the vehicle
and sends them to the RSU securely. The RSU then broadcasts the
keys and certiﬁcates securely to the vehicles in the region and the
corresponding vehicles receive them and use them for communication. Their privacy-preserving anonymous authentication scheme
not only authenticates received messages but also veriﬁes the legitimacy of the senders of the messages (i.e., it checks if the sender
is a malicious node which forged the ID of some legitimate node).
In addition, to reduce the computational complexity, they do not
use bilinear pairing based cryptography. It allows the user’s password to be changed dynamically. So, this scheme can resist smart
card loss attack, impersonation attack, and password guessing attack.
The protocol presented by Paruchuri and Durresi [116] also uses
smart cards to generate anonymous keys on-the-ﬂy for establishing secure V2V as well as V2I communication. The TA issues smart
cards as well as the keys to the vehicles and certiﬁcates to RSUs.
The vehicle’s ID, required cryptographic keys, and driver information are stored on the smart card. To send a message to vehicles
within its group, ﬁrst a vehicle needs to get a session key securely
from the nearby RSU. To send a message m to a vehicle within its
group, it encrypts the message m and the ID of the OBU and the
signature of m (hash of m encrypted with its private key V P r ) encrypted with the public key E R SU P u of the RSU using the session
key K e as follows and sends it:

E K e (m, E R SU P u ( O BU I D , E V P r ( H (m))))
A receiving vehicle can decrypt the message using the session key
issued by the RSU. However, it cannot decrypt the second part
because the private Key of the RSU is needed for decrypting the
second part. The second part is used by the RSU to trace misbehaving nodes, when necessary. Table 8 summarizes the strengths
and weaknesses of protocols discussed in this section.
Next, we discuss some of the protocols that minimize the overhead involved in using the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) for generating and assigning keys, pseudonyms, certiﬁcates, and CRLs to
vehicles and/or RSUs.
3.7. Minimizing the overhead involved in public key infrastructure (PKI)
based protocols
The anonymous authentication protocol presented by Wang et
al. [121] uses the TA to assign each vehicle and each RSU a long
term certiﬁcate during registration. Each RSU is responsible for
assigning a master key to each vehicle entering its region after
authenticating the vehicle based on its long term certiﬁcate. Then
the vehicle uses the master key to generate pseudonyms locally
and uses them to sign messages to preserve anonymity. This approach has lower signature veriﬁcation overhead compared to the
protocols presented in [73] and [122]. Moreover, it supports both
single and batch authentication of messages.
The Secure and Authenticated Key Management Protocol (SAKMP) presented by Hengchuan et al. [133], combines the idea of
the Public Key Regime (PKR) (which delegates the distribution of
public keys to the RSUs, eliminating the need to distribute digital certiﬁcates) proposed by Shen et al. [134] and the idea of
3-D matrix key distribution scheme (which generates the keys dynamically instead of preloading the keys), proposed by Hamid et
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al. [135,136]. Wasef et al. [123] propose a mechanism based on PKI
which supports not only location privacy but also authentication;
it also uses a distributed approach for certiﬁcate revocation. They
use the Message Authentication Acceleration (MAAC) [72] protocol
to make the revocation checking process faster without checking
the CRLs. However, their solution can only preserve the location
privacy of vehicles within its group. They also propose a method
for mitigating Denial of Service (DoS) attacks.
Biswas and Misic [124], [125], [126] use proxy signatures for
privacy-preserving authentication. One drawback of this solution is
that it requires larger keys for generating and verifying signatures.
As a result, it incurs higher computational cost compared to other
competitive schemes such as Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems (ECC) to
provide similar security strength.
Dong et al. [127] propose a privacy-preserving data forwarding scheme for service oriented VANETs based on Lite-TA-based
public key cryptography and on-path onion encryption scheme.
This scheme has lower encryption cost and public key management complexity compared to conventional public key encryption
schemes. However, since this approach requires relaying nodes to
encrypt the message before forwarding to prevent adversaries from
tracing message ﬂows, it incurs higher computation overhead for
forwarding packets.
Haas et al. [128] propose a method for quick, organized and
eﬃcient distribution of CRLs through V2V communication [137].
This scheme ensures backward privacy of revoked vehicles prior to
their revocation. They use the probabilistic data structure Bloom
ﬁlters [75] for quickly checking CRLs. However, false positives may
occur. But they claim that, false positives can be avoided by discarding the certiﬁcate of the vehicles that may trigger a false
positive. The use of Bloom ﬁlters reduces the overhead incurred
for checking CRLs. It is observed that the distribution of CRLs
through V2V communication is more eﬃcient and cost effective
than the RSU-based distribution scheme because it does not require widespread deployment of RSUs.
Many of the research works based on chameleon hash signature [130] using ﬁxed public keys for authentication do not guarantee message unlinkability. Shen et al. [129] address this problem
and propose a light weight privacy-preserving protocol that relies
on Elliptic Curve based chameleon hash signature and dynamic
public keys. They consider the registration phase and the mutual
authentication phase between OBUs and RSUs in their protocol.
They also considered the TA tracking phase to ensure authenticity and traceability. Whenever any suspicious event occurs, the TA
can recover the real identity of the OBU that created the event by
executing the TA tracking phase. The use of chameleon hash-based
signature for messages helps in preventing replay attacks and impersonation attacks. However, V2V authentication is not addressed
in this protocol.
The Security Credential Management System (SCMS) proposed
by Whyte et al. [131] is based on PKI; it was developed under
a cooperative agreement with the United States Department of
Transportation (USDOT), the leading candidate for V2V security
backend design in the United States. This scheme adds some additional features such as the number of vehicles it supports and
tries to achieve a tradeoff between security, privacy and eﬃciency
of traditional PKI based approaches. Additionally, they propose (i)
a frequent certiﬁcate changing (e.g., every 5 minutes) scheme to
enhance protection against attackers outside of the SCMS and (ii)
organizational separation of operations of SCMS to protect against
attackers inside the SCMS.
Alshaer [132] proposed a secure connection model based on
the Vehicular Public Key Infrastructure (VPKI) that utilizes trusted
RSUs to establish secure connections and distribute secret keys
to vehicles within their transmission range. The probability of
the number of reachable neighboring vehicles that a Communi-

cation Enabled Vehicle (CEV) can reach has been derived using
Exponential distribution of time and space headways with a Robustness Factor (EwRF). They claim that suitable statistical distribution (e.g., exponential distribution, Generalized Extreme Value
(GEV) distribution) that characterizes inter-vehicle spacing can accurately contribute to secure connectivity. This approach requires
the widespread deployment of RSUs and RSUs are assumed to be
reliable. Table 9 summarizes the strengths and weaknesses of the
protocols discussed in this section.
3.8. Message aggregation and cooperative message authentication
Multiple vehicles could observe the same phenomena on the
road and try to disseminate it to other vehicles which wastes
bandwidth. To address this problem, message aggregation (as has
been proposed for sensor networks earlier) has been proposed.
Moreover, to reduce the overhead involved in message authentication, cooperative message authentication wherein vehicles share
the overhead due to message authentication, has been proposed.
We discuss the protocols in these categories in this subsection.
3.8.1. Protocols using message aggregation
The Aggregated Emergency Message Authentication (AEMA)
scheme proposed by Zhu et al. [138] is based on bilinear pairing.
Under AEMA, each vehicle registers with the TA (they call it an
Oﬄine Security Manager (OSM)) and obtains its public key certiﬁcate. Then, when a vehicle needs to send an emergency message, it
uses the following format ( T ype , Loc , I D , T ime , Sig , C ert ) to send
it. Here, T ype indicates the type of the event, Loc is the location
where the event occurred, I D is the pseudo ID of the vehicle, T ime
is the time when the event occurred, Sig denotes the signature of
the message, and C ert is the certiﬁcate. The receiver veriﬁes the
validity of the certiﬁcate C ert and the signature Sig and accepts
the message. The authors assume that each event is uniquely determined by T ype, Loc, and T ime. Hence, an intermediate node
receiving the message can eliminate duplicates and aggregate the
messages. The overhead involved in computing the signature based
on bilinear pairing is of some concern. In addition, the algorithm
depends on the central OSM for issuing certiﬁcates. The authors
assume that each observed event has a unique type. This scheme
does not ensure location privacy of vehicles because each message
carries the location information of vehicles.
Dietzel et al. [139] proposed selective attestation and trust fusion to detect attacks as well as mitigate their effects for semantic aggregation in VANETs. Their approach is based on a generic
data aggregation model, which makes it extensible and suitable for
the existing data aggregation schemes. In the trust fusion mechanism, multiple warnings of the same event are linked to alleviate
the need for a Global Unique Identiﬁer system (GUID) by using a
fuzzy logic technique. However, the bandwidth needed for selective attestation could slow down the message dissemination process. Many of the existing message aggregation techniques require
roads to be segmented into small ﬁxed-size regions for aggregating
messages originating from these regions. However, messages originating across regions cannot be aggregated using these approaches.
Van der Heijden et al. [140] address this problem and present a
scheme that allows more dynamic aggregation of messages.
Next, we discuss protocols in which vehicles cooperate to authenticate messages in order to reduce the overhead involved in
message authentication.
3.8.2. Protocols that use cooperative message authentication or batch
veriﬁcation
Hao et al.’s [141] distributed key management and Co-operative
Message Authentication Protocol (CMAP) based on short group signature [142] can detect compromised RSUs and the malicious vehi-
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Table 9
Summary of the protocols that address the overhead involved in PKI based protocols.
Paper

Year published

Focus area(s) of the paper

Method(s) used

Strengths and weaknesses

Wasef et al. [123]

2010

Location privacy,
authentication, and
certiﬁcate revocation

PKI and Message Authentication
Acceleration (MAAC) protocol

Fast revocation check process and mitigates
DoS attacks; location privacy may not be
ensured against outsider attacks.

Biswas and Misic [124–126]

2010

Self authentication and
anonymous message
delivery

PKI, proxy signatures

Preserves message integrity and anonymity;
RSU assisted proxy signatures.

Dong et al. [127]

2011

Privacy-preserving data
forwarding; speciﬁcally
designed for service
oriented VANETs

Lite-TA-based public key
cryptography; on-path onion
encryption scheme

Eﬃcient, robust and ensures higher trust level;
high computational overhead.

Haas et al. [128]

2011

Distribution of CRLs

PKI and Bloom ﬁlters [75]

Does not require ubiquitous deployment of
RSUs; false positives can be prevented;
computational overhead is somewhat low.

Shen et al. [129]

2012

Secure communication

Chameleon hash signature [130]

Ensures unlinkability, traceability and defense
against replay attack; V2V authentication is
not addressed.

Whyte et al. [131]

2013

Security credential
management system; V2V
communication

Public Key Infrastructure

The authors try to achieve a tradeoff between
privacy, security and eﬃciency; decentralized
certiﬁcate distribution; frequent certiﬁcate
changes could cause high overhead.

Alshaer [132]

2015

Securing VANETs
connectivity with the
support of RSUs

Vehicular Public Key
Infrastructure (VPKI)

Can predict uplink and downlink connectivity
probabilities in VANETs; assumes RSUs are
trustworthy.

Hengchuan et al. [133]

2016

Authenticated key
management

Public key regime (PKR) [134];
the 3-D matrix key distribution
scheme [135,136]

This approach is more scalable than PKI based
approaches; key generation takes less time
compared to Elliptic Curve Diﬃe-Hellman and
Diﬃe-Hellman protocols.

Wang et al. [121]

2017

Privacy, security and
authentication

Does not use PKI for generating
pseudonyms and the related
certiﬁcates to vehicles; vehicles
generate their own pseudonyms

This approach has less signature veriﬁcation
overhead compared to the protocols presented
in [73] and [122]; it supports both single and
batch authentication.

cles colluding with them. Vehicles getting keys from the same RSU
form a group. To ensure reliable key distribution, messages are encrypted using Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES)
and are transmitted using the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP).
This scheme allows the cooperative veriﬁers to cooperatively authenticate messages. Cooperative veriﬁers are selected dynamically
and distributively based on their own geographic locations relative
to the sender of the message. However, a malicious vehicle can
pretend to be a cooperative veriﬁer by creating many Sybil nodes
within its transmission range, which makes this scheme vulnerable
to Sybil attack.
Most of the research work on secure incentive schemes focus
only on cooperative packet forwarding; but due to the high mobility of vehicles, packets could be lost. To address this problem,
Lai et al. [143] propose a Secure Incentive scheme for Reliable Cooperative downloading in highway VANETs (SIRC) that uses two
phases, namely, cooperative downloading and cooperative forwarding which encourage vehicles to cooperate through an incentive
scheme; SIRC utilizes aggregated Camenisch-Lysyanskaya (CL) signature [52] to cooperate with others in securely downloading-andforwarding packets. In this scheme, a reputation system is implemented to reward the cooperating vehicles and punish the malicious vehicles. In addition, a partial prepayment strategy is used
to minimize the payment risk to client vehicles. This scheme can
resist various attacks such as free riding attack, DoS attacks and
packet injection/removing attack. The performance evaluation of
SIRC shows that it has high download success rate, low download
delay, and moderate computation and communication overhead.
A disadvantage of this approach is that the reputation information
about vehicles which have high variability in their spatial distribution need to be calculated and stored.
Wang and Liu [144] proposed a scheme that satisﬁes the security requirements in Vehicular Heterogeneous Networks (VHNs)

wherein support for cooperative communication among various
types of networks such as networks based on DSRC-based on IEEE
802.11p, Device to Device (D2D) communication and cellular communication needs to be provided. A mode selection algorithm that
allows the OBUs to check the remaining lifetime of a packet and
switch between three different modes (DSRC, D2D-V and cellular
networks) is also presented. They found that suﬃcient power and
vehicle density are the main factors for the successful transmission
of messages securely in such networks.
Lin and Li [145] presented a cooperative message authentication scheme to reduce not only the overhead involved in message authentication but also the authentication delay. This scheme
tries to minimize the authentication overhead on the same message by different vehicles when vehicles are allowed to cooperatively authenticate messages. To encourage vehicles to cooperate
in message authentication, vehicles are issued evidence tokens. An
evidence token issued to a vehicle reﬂects its contribution to authentication in the past; this encourages vehicles to participate
in the message authentication process, which helps in distributing the authentication load among many vehicles. Evidence tokens
are obtained from the TA via the RSU in its current region. It also
uses a large number of pseudonyms, which could result in long
CRLs. Jiang et al. [146] also propose an authentication scheme under which requests from multiple vehicles can be authenticated
in batches rather than one by one. Cheon and Yi [147] proposed
a method for batch veriﬁcation of multiple signatures generated
by different signers as well as a single signer. They showed how
this technique can be applied to the modiﬁed DSA and ECDSA
based signatures. They also show that their batch veriﬁcation approach is seven times faster than individual veriﬁcation. Wasef et
al. [148,149] proposed a ﬂexible certiﬁcate distribution scheme and
an eﬃcient way for vehicles to update their certiﬁcates. To decrease the message authentication overhead, they also proposed

14

D. Manivannan et al. / Vehicular Communications 25 (2020) 100247

Table 10
Brief summary of protocols that support message aggregation, cooperative message authentication, and/or batch veriﬁcation.
Paper

Year published

Focus area(s) of the
paper

Method(s) used

Strengths and weaknesses

Zhu et al. [138]

2008

Emergency message
authentication

Bilinear pairing; message aggregation

Does not ensure location privacy; useful for propagation
of short emergency messages only.

Dietzel et al. [139]

2010

Secure data
aggregation

Generic aggregation model and Fuzzy
logic methodology

Extensible and alleviates the need of a Global Unique
Identiﬁer system (GUID); bandwidth overhead could
decrease dissemination speed.

Hao et al. [141]

2011

Authentication, security
and privacy

Bilinear pairing; short group
signatures [142]

Cooperative message authentication to speed up
authentication; does not ensure location privacy of
vehicles; vehicles in different regions cannot securely
exchange messages; group-signatures generally have
high signature veriﬁcation and revocation costs; RSUs
are assumed to be trustworthy; cooperative
authentication would work only if the density of
vehicles is high; susceptible to location modiﬁcation
because messages are selected for veriﬁcation based on
location information.

Jiang et al. [146]

2013

Privacy, security and
authentication

Pseudonyms and ID-based signature,
hash message authentication code

Supports batch authentication of requests; Tamper-proof
devices (TPDs) are needed to store pseudonyms; TPDs
could be susceptible to side-channel attacks.

Lin and Li [145]

2013

Privacy, security and
authentication

Cooperative message authentication;
uses large number of pseudonyms for
ensuring anonymity

Due to the large number of pseudonyms issued to
vehicles, CRLs could grow.

Lai et al. [143]

2017

Reliable cooperative
downloading

PKI; incentive scheme based on
reputation

Can resist different types of attacks including DoS
attacks; can be diﬃcult to calculate and store reputation
information correctly.

Wang and Liu [144]

2018

Secure cooperative
communication in
heterogeneous
vehicular networks

PKI, stochastic geometry theory and
optimization

Flexible; allows to switch between DSRC, D2D-V and
cellular networks modes; Requires OBUs with high
computation power.

a method for verifying certiﬁcate-based signatures of messages in
batches. Zhang and Zhang [150] developed a method for aggregating signatures in a certiﬁcate-less public key setting.
Table 10 summarizes the strengths and weaknesses of the protocols discussed in this section.
4. Recommendations and open issues for further research
For the widespread deployment of VANETs, the following important issues need to be thoroughly addressed and eﬃcient, scalable solutions for them need to be found: (i) authentication of
vehicles and messages (ii) secure message dissemination and (iii)
privacy of users need to be protected.
4.1. Scalable and distributed authentication and secure message
dissemination protocols
VANETs could support various safety-related applications such
as safe driving, collision avoidance, timely reporting of events such
as accidents to law enforcement agencies, facilitating the law enforcement agencies to reconstruct events such as accidents and
speeding violations, hazard awareness and many others. Moreover,
VANET users could also beneﬁt from infotainment and software
download. For implementing these facilities, scalable solutions for
authentication and secure message dissemination need to be designed. Most of the solutions presented in the literature for this
problem are centralized. Few attempts have been made to solve
these problems using decentralized approaches. Further research
is needed to address this scalability issue. Cooperative message
authentication has been proposed to distribute the burden of authentication among vehicles. Such protocols could be susceptible
to Sybil attacks because a malicious node can create several Sybil
nodes. These protocols, in general, use location information to select messages. So, these protocols could be susceptible to location
modiﬁcation attacks.

4.2. Privacy of vehicles
Ensuring the privacy of vehicles is an important issue in
VANETs. Otherwise, vehicle owners’ life could be jeopardized. So,
in all communications, a vehicle should not use its real identity. To
solve this problem, several solutions have been proposed. A vast
majority of the solutions proposed use pseudonyms instead of
the real ids of vehicles in the communication. This requires large
number of pseudonyms to be loaded into the vehicles OBUs and
they need to be kept secret. Moreover, to punish malicious vehicles (i.e., vehicles disseminating malicious messages or modifying
the messages sent by other vehicles), vehicles’ real ids need to be
traced. Thus, even though privacy needs to be preserved, authorities should still be able to trace and punish malicious vehicles.
Vehicles cannot use the same pseudonym for a long time, because then, based on the path traversed by vehicles, an intruder
can associate the pseudonym with the real id. Thus pseudonyms
should be changed frequently. Some authors suggest changing
pseudonyms every ﬁve seconds to prevent an intruder from linking two messages to the same vehicles and tracking the vehicle.
So, each vehicle needs to be assigned millions of pseudonyms during its lifetime and also a scalable mechanism for tracking which
vehicle has been assigned what pseudonym needs to be designed
and implemented. Moreover, when a vehicle is revoked, the certiﬁcates associated with the pseudonyms of the revoked vehicle need
to be disseminated to all vehicles/RSUs. This could lead to an exponential growth of CRLs which could slow down the authentication
of messages. So, centralized solutions are not scalable. Some solutions proposed for handling this problem allow the distribution of
the task of creating and distributing the certiﬁcates as well as CRLs
to the RSUs. However, more research needs to be done in devising
highly eﬃcient, scalable privacy-preserving methods to solve this
problem.
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4.3. Availability of roadside infrastructures
Many of the solutions presented assume the availability of
RSUs. However, we will not see widespread deployment of RSUs
in the near future. So, solutions proposed in the future should also
consider the scenarios in which there is no widespread deployment of RSUs. Due to advances in new technologies and a growing
number of vehicles, the design of reliable and scalable VANETs architectures that support multiple technologies (e.g., DSRC, D2D-V
and Cellular Networks) is also important. In such a scenario, vehicles need to authenticate with entities in different networks. This
is especially challenging because vehicles in VANETs use privacypreserving authentication and other networks do not use privacypreserving authentication.
4.4. Metrics for evaluating protocols designed for VANETs
Some researchers have proposed metrics for evaluating protocols for authentication and security in VANETs. However, these
metrics do not capture all the requirements. Metrics need to be
developed and standardized; moreover, simulators and testbeds
for evaluating protocols based on these metrics need to be implemented.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we presented a survey of papers published in the
last ten years that address privacy, authentication and secure message dissemination in VANETs. Based on the tools and techniques
used in the papers, we classiﬁed the papers into various categories.
We made a comparative study of the protocols in each category
and discussed their strengths and weaknesses. Then, we discussed
some of the open issues that remain to be addressed. We hope this
survey will serve as ready reference for other researchers working
in these areas and also help in addressing some of the open issues.
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